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Abstract : We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model
of successive oligopoly that captures both eﬃciency gains and strategic eﬀects. We show
that vertical merger waves can be expected to stop by themselves before integration is
complete. Consequently, vertical foreclosure plays no signiﬁcant role in this paper that
claims for a soft approach of vertical integration by antitrust authorities.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that there are three main motivations to vertically integrate for an
upstream ﬁrm and a downstream ﬁrm. The ﬁrst motivation documented in the economic
literature is the minimization of transaction costs by the choice of an optimal governance
structure for contractual relationships. In this strand of literature, vertical integration is
viewed as one possible governance structure. The second motivation is described by the
property rights literature that argues that the optimal allocation of property rights on
assets allows ﬁrms to reduce to the minimum the problem of the ex ante nonoptimality of
investment levels. Vertical integration is just one possible allocation of property rights and,
in fact, one has to distinguish between diﬀerent types of vertical integration, depending
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1on who owns the assets (the downstream or the upstream ﬁrm). There are substantial
diﬀerences between these two ways to envision vertical integration (see Whinston (2001)
for more details), but both claim that vertical integration may allow ﬁrms to achieve
eﬃciency gains that nonintegrated ﬁrms could not achieve. The third motivation for
vertical integration is quite diﬀerent. It relies on the analysis of vertical integration in a
strategic context and claims that vertical integration may be proﬁtable because it allows
ﬁrms to reduce their costs through the elimination of double marginalization (this is in
fact a story about eﬃciency gains resulting from vertical integration) and thus to be in
a better position when competing with their rivals on the ﬁnal market. At this point,
the story goes on with the ”vertical foreclosure” argument. Indeed, it is claimed that
vertical integration is also a rising rivals’ costs strategy because the integrated ﬁrm leaves
the intermediate market, nonintegrated upstream ﬁrms enjoy more market power and rise
the intermediate price that they charge to independent downstream ﬁrms. So, according
to this foreclosure story, vertical integration is proﬁtable both because it reduces the
double margin for the merging ﬁrms and because it increases the double margin for those
who remain independent. There is a quite hot debate on foreclosure since the Chicago
school economists criticized the ﬁrst, unformal version of the foreclosure theory. The
seminal paper by Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) layed the foundations for a new
foreclosure theory based on more convincing game theoretic arguments. More recently,
Avenel (2000), Choi and Yi (2000) and Church and Gandal (2000), relying on the idea that
ﬁrms can make strategic technological choices that commit them to foreclose their rivals,
have proved that vertical foreclosure can emerge in models in which vertical integration
is endogenous, technological choices are endogenous and there is no assumption on the
ability of integrated ﬁrms to commit to a price.
Although the debate on vertical foreclosure is extremely interesting, it is quite unfortu-
nate that the analysis of vertical integration in a strategic context has focused exclusively
on this issue. Indeed, the previously quoted models assume that the upstream indus-
try is a duopoly, so that under partial vertical integration, the independent upstream
ﬁrm enjoys monopoly power on the residual demand and the rising rivals’ costs is quite
strong. But what about industries with less concentrated upstream markets ? Clearly, if
2competition is quite strong between upstream ﬁrms, the vertical merger of one upstream
ﬁrm with a downstream ﬁrm will not allow its upstream competitors to substantially rise
their price and the rising rivals’ costs eﬀect will be very small. It is in fact absent as
soon as there are three (identical) upstream ﬁrms, constant returns to scale and Bertrand
competition. This is precisely the framework that we use in this paper. This prediction
that vertical foreclosure is not an issue as long as there is a substantial degree of com-
petition on the residual intermediate market may well explain why it is so diﬃcult to
ﬁnd empirical evidence of foreclosure (Rosengren and Meehan (1994), for example, ﬁnd
no empirical support for the foreclosure theory). Indeed, duopoly competition is not the
general rule on intermediate markets. We think that it is time to develop a theory of
endogenous vertical integration in strategic contexts that (i) takes into account the eﬃ-
ciency gains resulting from vertical integration as described in the transaction costs and
property rights literatures and (ii) takes into account the possibility of vertical foreclosure
without putting an exagerate emphasis on it. The model that we describe below is an
attempt to contribute to such a theory of vertical integration.
This model is closely related to McLaren (2000), since we also determine the degree of
vertical integration resulting from simultaneous integration choices in a industry composed
of the same number of upstream and downstream ﬁrms. There is however a diﬀerence
between the two models that happens to be critical. In McLaren (2000), there is no
competition between downstream ﬁrms on the ﬁnal market or, equivalently, the eﬃciency
gains associated to vertical integration take the form of lower ﬁxed costs for downstream
ﬁrms. They thus have no impact on prices and outputs on the ﬁnal market. In my
model, the eﬃciency gains take the form of lower marginal costs for upstream ﬁrms, this
reduction leading to lower marginal costs for downstream ﬁrms. Prices and outputs then
depend on the vertical structure of the industry. This eﬀect is strong enough to reverse the
main result of McLaren (2000). There is no longer strategic complementarity in vertical
integration, but rather strategic substituability, with profoundly diﬀerent implications in
terms of how antitrust policy should deal with vertical integration.
The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section, we present the model and
determine equilibrium prices and outputs in the various possible industrial structures. In
3section 3, we examine how the technological choice of ﬁr m si sr e l a t e dt ot h e i rd e c i s i o n
regarding vertical integration. In section 4, we establish our main result on the structural
and technological features of the industry in equilibrium. Section 5 is devoted to the
analysis of the implications for antitrust policy. In section 6, we discuss welfare. Section
7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section, we describe the model, beginning with the technologies available to ﬁrms.
2.1 Technologies
We assume that there exists a generic technology that any ﬁrm in the industry (upstream,
downstream or integrated) can adopt. Furthermore, all the ﬁrms using this technology
are equally eﬃcient, with constant marginal costs of production taken equal to c>0 for
upstream ﬁrms and normalized to 0 for downstream ﬁrms. Alternatively, each pair of
ﬁrms (either an integrated ﬁrm or a pair of independent upstream and downstream ﬁrms)
can adopt a speciﬁc technology that is only available to this pair of ﬁrms and that is more
eﬃcient than the generic technology. More precisely, the upstream marginal cost is equal
to c−ε > 0 and the downstream cost is equal to 0.T h es p e c i ﬁcity of the technology implies
that a speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di sl e s se ﬃcient when used with another technology. We
denote by δ the cost, assumed to be constant, of adapting one unit of speciﬁc input to
the generic technology or another speciﬁc technology. This is also the cost of adapting a
unit of generic intermediate good to a speciﬁc technology. It may be convenient to think
of the adoption of a speciﬁc technology as the decision to build two new production units
located at the same place, wide away from other production units. Transportation costs
are reduced between the two plants (this is ε), but increased between each of the two
plants and any plant located elsewhere (this is δ). We assume that the adoption of a
speciﬁc technology requires investment in speciﬁc assets both upstream and downstream.
As a consequence, a pair of independent ﬁrms can adopt the speciﬁc technology available
to it only if both ﬁrms agree on this decision. Given the incomplete nature of contracts
4in this model, vertical integration may be proﬁtable to a pair of ﬁrms because it allows
them to adopt the more eﬃcient, speciﬁct e c h n o l o g y .G i v e nt h e s ep r e m i s s e s ,w en o wc a n
describe the model.
2.2 Set-up
We consider an industry composed of n ≥ 2 downstream ﬁrms (Di)i=1,...,n and the same
number n of upstream ﬁrms (Ui)i=1,...,n that supply them with an intermediate good that
they transform into a ﬁn a lg o o do nao n ef o ro n eb a s i s .W ea s s u m et h a tﬁnal goods are
horizontally diﬀerentiated and, more speciﬁcally, that the demand for good i is given by




In (1), pi is the price charged by Di, pj the price charged by Dj and qi the quantity
sold by Di for the vector of prices. We denote by P the vector of prices on the ﬁnal
market.
For this demand function to make sense, we must assume that condition (2) below
holds. If it would not, a general increase in prices would increase the output of each ﬁrm
and the total output.
γ < β/(n − 1) (2)
As regards competition on the intermediate market, we assume that upstream ﬁrms
are engaged in price competition and denote by W =( wi)i=1,...,n the vector of prices
charged by upstream ﬁrms. We further assume that the upstream ﬁrms using the generic
technology produce an homogeneous intermediate good, whereas each usptream ﬁrm using
as p e c i ﬁc technology produces an intermediate good diﬀerent from every other variety of
the intermediate good. It is possible to transform intermediate goods to adapt them to a
technology they were not designed for at a cost δ. We assume, without loss of generality,
that this cost is supported by upstream ﬁrms.
5The model is built on a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each pair Ui − Di has to
decide on two points, integration and technology. At the end of stage 1,t h e r ea r et h u s
four types of pairs of ﬁrms. We denote by nSG the number of pairs of ﬁrms that are not
integrated (i.e., separated) and use the generic technology, nIG the number of integrated
ﬁrms using the generic technology, nSS the number of non-integrated pairs of ﬁrms using
as p e c i ﬁc technology and nIS the number of integrated ﬁr m su s i n gas p e c i ﬁct e c h n o l o g y .
In the second stage, upstream ﬁrms simultaneously make oﬀers on the intermediate
market, which determines W. In the third stage, downstream ﬁrms put prices, observe
the demand, purchase the needed quantity of intermediate good and transform it into the
ﬁnal good. We solve the game backward, thus determining subgame perfect equilibria.
Because of Bertrand competition on the intermediate market, no downstream ﬁrm will
pay more than c + δ for its input, since this is the highest possible cost for an upstream
ﬁrm to supply the downstream ﬁrm. Since we don’t want to consider situations where
downstream ﬁrms are driven out of the market, we assume that any ﬁrm can make positive
proﬁto nt h eﬁnal market with a cost equal to c + δ, which is the case under condition
(3).
α − β (c + δ) > 0 (3)
The proﬁto fd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm i is given by
ΠDi (wi,P)=( pi − wi)
Ã




















Solving the n ﬁrst-order conditions determines P∗ (W), the vector of equilibrium down-
stream prices conditional on W. The next step in the resolution is thus to determine W∗,
6the vector of input prices in equilibrium (conditional on the structure of the industry
determined in stage 1).
The internal transfer price within integrated ﬁr m si sj u s tt h em a r g i n a lc o s to fp r od u c i n g
the intermediate good. We thus have nIG ﬁrms with a marginal cost equal to c and nIS
ﬁrms with a marginal cost equal to c − ε on the ﬁnal market. Integrated ﬁrms have no
interest in purchasing input on the market. To the contrary, they have an interest in
selling input on the market and competing with non-integrated upstream ﬁrms. As a
result, if there are at least two upstream ﬁrms (integrated or not) that use the generic
technology, they charge a price equal to the marginal cost c. This is the usual Bertrand
result. Upstream speciﬁc ﬁrms cannot match such a price. In this case, thus, the nSG
generic non-integrated downstream ﬁrms have a cost equal to c. If there is only one
upstream ﬁrm using the generic technology, it can rise the price above c,b e c a u s ei t s
competitors will not propose less than c+δ. It may not be optimal for the upstream ﬁrm
to rise the price up to c+δ,b u tw ea s s u m et h a tδ is small enough for the upstream ﬁrm to
charge c + δ to the (unique) downstream ﬁrm using the generic technology. Let’s ﬁnally,
consider the price charged by speciﬁc upstream ﬁrms. Because the speciﬁc technologies
are diﬀerent, each speciﬁc upstream ﬁrm can rise the price it charges to its natural client
up to c+δ, the price at which other upstream ﬁrms are ready to supply the downstream
ﬁr m .W ea s s u m et h a tε and δ are small enough for the upstream ﬁrm to reach this upper
bound and charge c+δ for its variety of the intermediate good. Table 1 summarizes these
results.
nIG ≥ 1 or nSG ≥ 2( nIG;nSG)=( 0 ;1 ) ( nIG;nSG)=( 0 ;0 )
wIG c −−
wIS c − ε c − ε c − ε
wSG cc + δ −
wSS c + δ c + δ c + δ
In table 1, wSG is the price paid by a non-integrated downstream generic ﬁrm for its
input. wIS, wIG and wSS are deﬁn e di nas i m i l a rw a y ,s ot h a t
7W =

wIG,...,wIG | {z }
nIG
,w IS,...,wIS | {z }
nIS
,w SG,...,wSG | {z }
nSG




The ordering of downstream ﬁrms implicit in (6) is evident and will be used in what
follows.
An important implication of the results summarized in table 1 is that vertical integra-
tion doesn’t rise the costs of non-integrated rivals in this model, unless the merger leaves
only one non-integrated generic downstream ﬁrm and no integrated ﬁrm uses the generic
technology (nIG =0and nSG =1 ). This is precisely the case in the successive duopoly
models discussed in the introduction. In this sense, this model is a generalization of these
previous models
Replacing wi by its expression in (5) and solving the system of ﬁrst-order conditions
leads to the expression of equilibrium downstream prices (conditional on the industrial
structure resulting from stage 1). Due to the rising rivals’ costs eﬀect discussed above,
the expression of prices is particular when nIG =0and nSG =1 .W et h u so b t a i nt w os e t s
of expressions for prices.
As soon as nIG 6=0or nSG 6=1 , the prices are given by equations (7) to (10).
pSG =
1
2β + γ − γn
µ








2β + γ − γn
µ
α + βc + βδ+
γβ
2β + γ
((nSS − n)δ − nISε)
¶
(8)
pIG = pSG (9)
pIS =
1
2β + γ − γn
µ
α + βc − βε+
γβ
2β + γ
(nSSδ +( n − nIS)ε)
¶
(10)
8Each of the previous expressions has three terms : a constant reﬂecting the level of
demand, a term determined by the level of the ﬁrm’s cost that corresponds to the direct
impact of costs on price and a term determined by the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s cost
and its rivals’ costs that corresponds to the strategic eﬀect of costs on prices.
For nIG =0and nSG =1 , the expressions of prices are equations (11)t o( 13).
˜ pSG =
1
2β + γ − γn
µ






˜ pSS = pSG (12)
˜ pIS =
1
2β + γ − γn
µ
α + βc − βε+
γβ
2β + γ
(n − nIS)(ε + δ)
¶
(13)
Again, we ﬁnd the constant, the direct eﬀect and the strategic eﬀect described above.
From the vectors of prices W and P, we can deduce ﬁrms’ outputs and proﬁts, both
upstream and downstream. It is not necessary to give these expressions to determine
the industrial structure resulting from stage 1,w h i c hi st h en e x t( a n dﬁnal) step of the
resolution of our model.
3 The link between integration and technology
The essence of the eﬃciency defense is to claim that vertical integration allows ﬁrms to
achieve eﬃciency gains. In this model, this is justiﬁed only if non-integrated ﬁrms cannot
adopt a speciﬁc technology due to the incomplete nature of contracts. Contracts are
indeed incomplete, since it just speciﬁes a price and the possibility for the downstream
ﬁrm to get any quantity of input for that price. However, it is not necessary that this
indeed prevents non-integrated ﬁrms from adopting a speciﬁc technology. In the ﬁrst part
of this section, we examine this point and prove that, in this model, non-integrated ﬁrms
adopt a generic technology (in equilibrium) because the adoption of a speciﬁc technology
9reduces the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm that will thus refuse it. In the second part of
the section, we examine the related question of whether integrated ﬁrms adopt a speciﬁc
technology and we show that, except for one possible equilibrium, it is the case, so that
there is coincidence between integration and the use of a speciﬁc technology.
3.1 The technological choice of non-integrated ﬁrms
We show that, regardless of the type of the other pairs of ﬁrms in the industry, a non-
integrated downstream ﬁr mu s i n gas p e c i ﬁc technology would be better oﬀ if it used the
generic technology. For this reason, it will refuse to adopt a speciﬁc technology and, since
we assume that the adoption of a speciﬁc technology is possible only if the upstream and
the downstream ﬁrms agree on it, we conclude that non-integrated ﬁrms adopt the generic
technology.
We proceed by ﬁrst showing that the variation in gross proﬁt associated to this devia-
tion is positive and then introducing the ﬁxed costs associated to the diﬀerent technologies
to assert the net proﬁtability of the deviation.
3.1.1 Gross incentives to deviate from SS to SG
Evaluating the sign of the variation in gross proﬁt associated to the deviation from the
speciﬁc to the generic technology for a non-integrated downstream ﬁrm leads to the fol-
lowing result.
Lemma 1 ∀(nSS,n SG,n IS,n IG) ∈ {1;...;}×{ 0;...;n − 1}×{ 0;...;n}
2 such that nSS +
nSG + nIS + nIG = n,
ΠSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ,n IS,n IG) ≥ ΠSS(nSS,n SG,n IS,n IG)
Sketch of the proof (mathematical details in appendix A)
The gross proﬁto fan o n - i n t e g r a t e ds p e c i ﬁcd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm is given by equation
(14).
ΠSS(nSS,n SG)=( pSS (nSS,n SG) − c − δ)qSS(nSS,n SG) (14)
10For notational simplicity, we skip the variables nIS and nIG that will be constant. We
also denote by mSS(nSS,n SG) the price cost margin and write the ﬁrm’s proﬁt as follows
ΠSS(nSS,n SG)=mSS(nSS,n SG)qSS(nSS,n SG) (15)
If the pair of ﬁrms switches to the generic technology, the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt
becomes
ΠSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) (16)
We can now compute the variation in the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁta s
∆Π(nSS,n SG)=ΠSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− ΠSS(nSS,n SG) (17)
Replacing the proﬁts by their expressions and rearranging the terms leads to
∆Π(nSS,n SG)=
Ã
mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
−mSS(nSS,n SG)
!Ã




+(mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− mSS (nSS,n SG))qSS (nSS,n SG)
+(qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS (nSS,n SG))mSS (nSS,n SG)
We now show that both the variation in margin and in output are positive. Since,
qSS (nSS,n SG) and mSS(nSS,n SG) are positive, this implies that ∆Π(nSS,n SG) is posi-
tive : any non-integrated speciﬁcd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm would like to switch to the generic
technology. Conversely, no non-integrated generic downstream ﬁrm will accept to switch
t oas p e c i ﬁc technology. Since the expression of prices and proﬁts depends on nIG and
nSG, we distinguish three cases.
Case 1 : nIG ≥ 1 or nSG ≥ 2
It is straightforward to calculate the price-cost margin and show that
11mSS (nSS,n SG)=
1
2β + γ − γn
µ
α − (β + γ − γn)(c + δ)+
γβ
2β + γ
((nSS − n)δ − nISε)
¶
(19)
We then calculate the variation in margin as
mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) = mSS(nSS,n SG) (20)
+
1
2β + γ − γn
"






Since both terms in the bracketted expression are positive, this proves that the down-
stream ﬁrm increases its margin when the pair of ﬁrms switches to the generic technology.
This is simply because it reduces its cost by δ, which provides it with a cost advantage
over its competitors and allows it to rise its price-cost margin.
Calculating the variation in output is longer, but not more diﬃcult. We establish
equation (21) in appendix A.
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) = qSS(nSS,n SG)+β [pSS (nSS,n SG) − pSG(nSS,n SG)] (21)
+
1





(β + γ − γn)δ
The ﬁrst term in (21) is positive, as well as the third one. As regards the second term,
it is easy to verify that




We thus conclude that the downstream ﬁrm increases its output after the switch to
the generic technology. Since the margin is also increasing, the ﬁrm increases its gross
proﬁt.
Case 2 : nIG =0and nSG =1
12The diﬀerence with the previous case is that when switching to the generic technology,
the downstream ﬁrm lowers its cost by δ, but it also lowers the cost of the other non-
integrated generic downstream ﬁrm by δ. There is thus a lowering rivals’ costs eﬀect
here that reduces the proﬁtability of the generic technology. However, we can show (see
appendix) that the margin increases, since




(nSS + nIS − 1)δ > 0 (23)
As regards the level of output, we ﬁnd
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) = qSS(nSS,n SG) (24)
+
1





[γ (β + γ − γn)+β (2β − γn)] > 0
This concludes the study of the second case. As in the ﬁrst case, any non-integrated
downstream ﬁrm prefers the generic technology to the speciﬁc one and, under our assump-
tion regarding ﬁxed costs (see below), no non-integrated pair of ﬁrms adopts a speciﬁc
technology.
Case 3 : nIG =0and nSG =0
In this case, the fact that a non-integrated speciﬁcp a i ro fﬁrms switches to the generic
technology doesn’t change the marginal cost of any downstream ﬁrm in the industry, not
even the marginal cost of the switching ﬁrm, which is equal to c + δ in both cases.
3.1.2 Net incentives to deviate from SS to SG
To determine the proﬁtability of the deviation, we have to specify assumptions on the ﬁxed
costs associated to the diﬀerent technologies. We normalize the ﬁxed cost associated to the
generic technology to 0 and denote by E the ﬁx e dc o s ta s s o c i a t e dt os p e c i ﬁc technologies.
Assumption E>0
Under this assumption, any non-integrated downstream ﬁrm prefers the generic tech-
nology to the speciﬁc technology. Since a speciﬁc technology cannot be adopted by a pair
13of ﬁrms without the consent of the downstream ﬁrm, no pair of non-integrated ﬁrms adopts
as p e c i ﬁc technology. In other words, it is necessary to integrate in order to achieve the
eﬃciency gains (in the sense of lower marginal costs) associated with a speciﬁc technology.
This is the sense of the proposition below.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, nSS =0 .
It can be noted that this result holds as long as speciﬁc technologies are not associated
with signiﬁcantly lower downstream ﬁxed costs than the generic technology. It is only
in this case, that we don’t consider here, that eﬃciency gains can be achieved without
vertical integration.
3.2 The technological choice of integrated ﬁrms
We examine the incentives of integrated ﬁrms using the generic technology to switch
to a non-integrated structure (while keeping the generic technology). The structure of
marginal costs presented in table I shows that, in general, generic ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between integration and separation, since their proﬁt (gross of any cost/beneﬁto fv e r t i c a l
integration not captured by the model) is the same in both cases. To avoid this indetermi-
nacy, we assume that there is a strictly positive cost of integration, so that ﬁrms strictly
prefer separation to integration. Since we don’t want to focus on these integration costs
that are not endogenous, we assume that they are very small.
There is one case, however, in which it is not indiﬀerent in terms of gross proﬁts for
generic ﬁrms to be integrated or not. It is when nIS = n−1. Then, an integrated generic
ﬁrm has a downstream cost equal to c, whereas a separated downstream generic ﬁrm has
a cost equal to c + δ. If we consider the joint proﬁts of the pair of ﬁrms, the comparison
of integration and separation is ambiguous. This is because there is a strategic positive
eﬀect on proﬁts when the downstream ﬁrm is committed to a higher cost. There is thus
not necessarily in this case a supplementary proﬁt to be shared between the upstream and
the downstream ﬁrms after a merger. We skip the analytical resolution that could allow
us to alleviate the indeterminacy, both because it is quite ackward and, more importantly,
because, as we said in the introduction, our focus in this paper is not on the strategic
14eﬀects that happen on the market (here, it is a residual market) when it is supplied by a
duopoly.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, nIG =0or (nIS,n IG,n SG,n SS)=( n − 1,1,0,0).
Proof Since we know that in equilibrium nSS =0 , we take this value as given.
We then have to show that, for any (nIS,n IG,n SG) 6=( n − 1,1,0) such that nIG ≥
1, ΠIG(nIS,n IG,n SG) < ΠSG(nIS,n IG − 1,n SG +1 ). This is straightforward, given the
values of costs given in table I and our assumptions concerning the costs of integration.
This proposition a partial result. It doesn’t fully describe the technological choice
of integrated ﬁrms in equilibrium. However, it is enough for our purpose in the present
section. In particular, it implies that, as well as there is no non-integrated pair of ﬁrms
using a speciﬁc technology, there is no integrated ﬁrm using the generic technology in an
equilibrium such that nSG ≥ 2, that is equilibria in which vertical foreclosure plays no
role. This is the type of equilibria that we focus on in the next section. We will thus focus
on situations in which it is equivalent to be integrated and to use a speciﬁc technology.
Since speciﬁc technologies are associated with lower marginal costs, vertical integration
increases the social surplus, as long as E is not to large.
4 Structural and technological choices in equilibrium
In this section, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium of the game deﬁned in
section 2. Our main result concerns those equilibria that are such that nSG ≥ 3.I t i s
established in the ﬁrst part of the section. In the second part of the section, we brieﬂy
discuss other equilibria and the possibility of multiple equilibria.
4.0.1 Main result
Proposition 4 For any k ∈ {0;...;n − 3}, there is a set of values of E such that
(nIS,n IG,n SS,n SG)=( k,0,0,n− k)
is an equilibrium and there is no other equilibrium satisfying nSG ≥ 3.
15Proof
We of course have to examine the incentives of ﬁrms to deviate from our equilibrium
candidate. Some of the results established in the previous section will prove helpfull.
We ﬁrst examine the incentives of ﬁrms to deviate from IS to IG a n de s t a b l i s ht h e
following lemma.
Lemma 5 ΠIS(nIG − 1;nIS +1 )> ΠIG(nIG;nIS).
Proof (details in appendix B)
Since we assume nSG ≥ 3, the technological choice of the integrated ﬁrm i will not
change the cost of non-integrated generic downstream ﬁrms. We proceed by calculating
the variations in margin and output for an integrated ﬁrm switching from the generic to
as p e c i ﬁc technology.
We show (see appendix B) that
mIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− mIG(nIG,n IS)=
1
2β + γ − γn
Ã
γ + β − γn
+
γβ
2β+γ (n − 1)
!
ε > 0 (25)
The variation in output is
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− qIG(nIG,n IS)=
β
3 + β (β + γ)(β + γ − γn)
(2β + γ − γn)(2β + γ)
ε > 0 (26)
Since both the margin and the output increase, the (gross) proﬁta l s oi n c r e a s e s .
We now consider the net incentive to deviate from IS to IG. No matter what the
structural and technological choices of rivals are, an integrated ﬁrm has an incentive to
adopt a speciﬁc technology. However, to do so, it must pay the ﬁxed cost E.S u p p o s et h a t
the incentive of an integrated ﬁrm to adopt a speciﬁc technology increases with the number
of integrated ﬁrms that already use a speciﬁc technology. Then, if it is proﬁtable for one
integrated ﬁrm to adopt a speciﬁc technology, it will be proﬁtable for every integrated
ﬁrm. However, we show that (at least for nSG ≥ 3) it is the contrary that holds : the
incentive of an integrated ﬁrm to switch to a speciﬁc technology is a decreasing function
16of the number of integrated ﬁr m su s i n gas p e c i ﬁc technology. In other words, the more
eﬃcient competitors you have, the less proﬁtable it is for you to become eﬃcient as well.
We establish this result below.
Deﬁnition 6 For any (nIG;nIS;nSG) ∈ {1;...;n}×{0;...;n}
2 such that nIG+nIS+nSG =
n,w ed e ﬁne ∆Π(nIG,n IS) as the diﬀerence in an integrated ﬁrm’s gross proﬁtw i t ha
speciﬁc and with a generic technology, that is,
∆Π(nIG,n IS)=ΠIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− ΠIG(nIG,n IS).
Lemma 7 For nSG ≥ 3, ∆Π(nIG,n IS) < ∆Π(nIG +1 ,n IS − 1).
Proof (details in appendix C)
We rewrite ∆Π(nIG,n IS) as
∆Π(nIG,n IS)=−
Ã
mIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
−mIG(nIG,n IS)
!Ã




+(mIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− mIG(nIG,n IS))qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
+(qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− qIG(nIG,n IS))mIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
Since the variations in margin and output calculated above don’t depend on
(nIG;nIS;nSG), we just have to examine how these parameters inﬂuence
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )and mIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 ) .
We show (see appendix C) that
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 ) = α +
1










β (2β + γ)










(2β + γ − γn)(2β + γ)
nISε
It is just the number nIS of integrated speciﬁc ﬁrms that inﬂuences qIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
and as it increases, qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )decreases.
17We also show that
mIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )=
1
2β + γ − γn
·
α +( γn − β − γ)(c − ε)+
βγ
2β + γ
(n − 1 − nIS)ε
¸
(29)
As for the output, the margin decreases when the number of integrated, speciﬁc ﬁrms
increases.
From (27), we conclude that the incentive of an integrated ﬁrm to adopt a speciﬁc
technology decreases with the number of ﬁrms that already use this technology as long
as it holds that nSG ≥ 3.
It is important to note that, for nSG ≥ 3, the incentive of ﬁrms to deviate from IS
to SG is equal to the incentive of ﬁrms to deviate from IS to IG, so that the previous
lemma also apply to this case.
To conclude our examination of deviations for IS ﬁrms, we have to consider the
deviation to the SS s t r a t e g y .W es h o w e di ns e c t i o n3 . 1 that SG is always prefered to SS,
so that if IS ﬁrms don’t ﬁnd proﬁtable to deviate to SG, they also don’t ﬁnd proﬁtable
to switch to SS.
To sum up, the equilibrium candidate will not be destroyed by a deviation by one of
the IS ﬁrms if and only if
∆Π(nIG +1 ,n IS − 1) = ΠIS (nIG,n IS) − ΠIG(nIG +1 ,n IS − 1) >E (30)
where ∆Π(nIG +1 ,n IS − 1) > ∆Π(nIG,n IS).
This implies that, for any nSG ≥ 3 and any nIS = n − nSG, there exists an interval of
values of E such that no IS ﬁrms can proﬁtably deviate.
We now turn to the examination of the deviations of SG (pairs of) ﬁrms. We know
that no SG ﬁrms will deviate to SS. Switching to IG is also not proﬁtable, since there
is no eﬀect on the marginal cost of any ﬁrm, but there is a strictly positive integration
cost. The only deviation that remains to examine is thus from SGto IS and the incentive
for a SG ﬁrm to deviate to IS is exactly the opposite of the incentive for a IS ﬁrm to
18deviate to SG discussed above. This means that there will be no proﬁtable deviation
from the candidate equilibrium for any SG ﬁrm if and only if condition (30) is satisﬁed.
This completes the proof.
This result shows that (quite) any degree of vertical integration can be an equilibrium
in our model. This is not solely due to our assumption of a strictly positive ﬁxed cost
associated with speciﬁc technologies, but more importantly to the fact that we do not
have the strategic complementarity found by McLaren (2000), but rather a strategic
substituability. When a pair of ﬁrms integrates, it lowers the proﬁtability of integration
for other ﬁrms. In McLaren (2000), it rises this proﬁtability. Strategic substituability
implies that when we observe a (vertical) merger wave in an industry, we have no reason
to expect that this merger wave will go on until vertical integration is generalized in the
industry. This result has important implications for antitrust policy that are discussed in
the next section.
4.0.2 Other equilibria
We discuss brieﬂy here the other possible equilibria. Since the equilibrium (nIS,n IG,n SG)=
(n − 1,1,0) was discussed above, we focus on equilibria for which nIG =0and thus con-
sider a pair (nIS,n SG) ∈ {0;...;n}×{ 0;1} such that nIS + nSG = n.
First take nSG =0 . Vertical integration is complete in the industry. Depending on
E, it may or may not be proﬁtable for one of the pair of ﬁrms to deviate to SG.T h e
particularity of this case is that the pair of ﬁrms may also ﬁnd proﬁtable to switch to
IG. However, if E is suﬃciently low, nIS = n is an equilibrium. Essentially, as the
number of IS ﬁrms increases, it gets less and less proﬁtable to be an IS ﬁrm, but it
remains proﬁtable (even taking into account the ﬁxed cost E) and full integration with
every integrated ﬁr mu s i n gas p e c i ﬁc technology is an equilibrium.
Now take nSG =1 . Then, it may happen that the proﬁtability of switching from IS
to SG ﬁrst decreases when nIS increases from 0 to n−2, but is higher when nIS = n−2
than when nIS = n−3. Because of this, there may be a value of E such that none of the
IS ﬁrms wants to switch to SG, but if one of them would do it, others may well follow
it and switch. If this non-monotonicity is not present, there may also exist a value of E
19such that nIS = n − 1 is an equilibrium, because no IS ﬁrm wants to switch, but then,
even if one does switch, no other will follow it.
Finally, for nSG =2 , the logic is the same as for nSG =1 , with the diﬀerence that
these are only the SG ﬁrms that can rise rivals’ costs by deviating to IS, thus leaving the
remaining SG ﬁrm alone with the generic technology. A deviation by IS ﬁrms would not
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect, because it would leave two pairs of SG ﬁrms on the market.
4.0.3 Multiple equilibria
Note that for a given value of E, there may be two equilibria for the game. Indeed, when
the proﬁtability of IS rather than SG in not monotonic for nSG =1 ,t h es a m eE may
be consistant with an equilibrium caracterized by nIS ≥ n − 1 and another equilibrium
caracterized by nIS <n−1. This multiplicity of equilibria is induced by the existence of
a rising rivals’ costs eﬀect in the industry when vertical integration is quite general. This
i sn o tt h ep o i n tt h a tw ew a n tt op o i n ta ti nt h i sa r t i c l e .
5 Implications for antitrust policy
In the famous Brown Shoe case, the US Supreme Court banned a benign vertical merger
with the argument that the objective was to stop a merger wave that would end in full
integration. This may be a very good argument if a ”snowball eﬀect” is present, that
is, under strategic complementarity. However, under strategic substituability, there is no
point stopping a merger wave at a very early stage instead of just waiting to see if the
merger wave will not stop by itself at an acceptable level of vertical integration. The
deﬁnition of what an acceptable level of vertical integration is leads us to discuss the
eﬀect of vertical integration on welfare in our model.
6W e l f a r e
The impact of vertical integration on welfare is ambiguous in this model. Indeed, vertical
integration impacts on welfare in three diﬀe r e n tw a y s: ( i )i ta l l o w sm e r g i n gﬁrms to
20achieve eﬃciency gains, which rises the welfare, (ii) it is associated with a ﬁxed cost,
which reduces the welfare and (iii) it may be a rising rivals’ costs strategy, which reduces
the welfare. Even if we abstract from the third eﬀect by focusing on merger waves that
stop before the number of separated ﬁrms is low enough for rising rivals’ costs eﬀect to
play, one can see that there is no clearcut result on welfare. This indeterminacy is diﬃcult
t oa v o i do n c ew et a k ei n t oa c c o u n tb o t ht h ee ﬃciency gains associated to integration and
the costs associated to it.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Within the framework of a successive Bertrand oligopoly model, we establish a result
of strategic substituability that has strong implications both on the predictions of the
model and on the implications of the analysis for the antitrust policy. Concerning the
ﬁrst point, we show that the degree of vertical integration in the model need not be either
0o r100 percent, but can take quite any value, depending on the ﬁxed cost associated
to speciﬁc technologies. In particular, it means that vertical merger waves may stop
before the industry is fully integrated. If this is the case, there is no foreclosure and no
rising rivals’ costs eﬀect associated with vertical integration. Generalising the successive
duopoly models that are the basis of the literature on strategic vertical integration thus
leads to the conclusion that these models may well have exagerated the importance of the
foreclosure issue. Insofar as we can base antitrust recommendations on our model, these
would be in favor of a less severe control of vertical integration.
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9 Appendix A : Proof of lemma 1
Case 1 : nIG ≥ 1 or nSG ≥ 2
We can write the proﬁt of a non-integrated speciﬁcd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm as follows :
ΠSS (nSS,n SG)=mSS (nSS,n SG)qSS (nSS,n SG),
with




α − (β + γ − γn)(c + δ)+
γβ
2β+γ ((nSS − n)δ − nISε)
´
If the pair of ﬁrms switches to the generic technology, the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt
becomes
ΠSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ),




α − (β + γ − γn)c +
γβ
2β+γ ((nSS − 1)δ − nISε)
´
We can compute the variation in Di’s proﬁt( g r o s so fa n yd i ﬀerence in the ﬁxed cost
associated to the diﬀerent technologies) as
∆Π(nSS,n SG)=ΠSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− ΠSS(nSS,n SG)
= mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
−mSS (nSS,n SG)qSS (nSS,n SG)
22=
Ã
mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
−mSS(nSS,n SG)+mSS(nSS,n SG)
!Ã
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
−qSS (nSS,n SG)+qSS(nSS,n SG)
!
−mSS (nSS,n SG)qSS (nSS,n SG)
=( mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− mSS (nSS,n SG))(qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS (nSS,n SG))
+(mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− mSS (nSS,n SG))qSS (nSS,n SG)
+(qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS(nSS,n SG))mSS (nSS,n SG)
Since quantities and margins are positive,
∆Π(nSS,n SG) > 0 if and only if mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− mSS(nSS,n SG) > 0 and
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS (nSS,n SG) > 0.
We now show that both the variation in margin and in output are positive.




α − (β + γ − γn)c +
γβ





α − (β + γ − γn)(c + δ)+
γβ










qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=α +( γnSG − β)pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γnIGpIG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )+γ (nSS − 1)pSS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γnISpIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
Since pIG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) ,
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=α +( γnSG + γnIG − β)pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γ (nSS − 1)pSS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )+γnISpIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
We now use the fact that
pIG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=pIG(nSS,n SG) −
γβ
(2β+γ−γn)(2β+γ)δ,




pIS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=pIS (nSS,n SG) −
γβ
(2β+γ−γn)(2β+γ)δ
to rewrite qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )as
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=α +( γnSG + γnIG − β)pSG(nSS,n SG)
+γ (nSS − 1)pSS (nSS,n SG)+γnISpIS(nSS,n SG)+
γβ(β+γ−γn)
(2β+γ−γn)(2β+γ)δ
Rearranging the terms leads to
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=α +( γnSG + γnIG)pSG(nSS,n SG)












(β + γ − γn)δ
Since
pSS (nSS,n SG) − pSG(nSS,n SG)=
βδ
2β+γ > 0,
every term on the right-hand side is positive and
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS(nSS,n SG) > 0.
Case 2 : nIG =0and nSG =1
We proceed as in the previous case to establish that
∆Π(nSS,n SG) > 0 if and only if mSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− mSS(nSS,n SG) > 0 and
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS (nSS,n SG) > 0.




α − (β + γ − γn)c +
γβ





α − (β + γ − γn)(c + δ) −
γβ


















qSS(nSS,n SG)=α − βpSS(nSS,n SG)+γ (nSS − 1)pSS(nSS,n SG)
+γnISpIS(nSS,n SG)+γnSGpSG(nSS,n SG)
= α +( γnSS − γ − β)pSS(nSS,n SG)+γnISpIS(nSS,n SG)
+γnSGpSG(nSS,n SG)
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )=α − βpSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γ (nSS − 1)pSS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )+γnISpIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γnSGpSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
= α +( γnSG − β)pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )+γ (nSS − 1)pSS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γnISpIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
= α + γnSGpSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )+( γnSS − γ − β)pSS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
+γnISpIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )
24+β (pSS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) )
= qSS (nSS,n SG)+( γnSS − γ − β)[pSS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− pSS (nSS,n SG)]
+γnIS[pIS(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− pIS (nSS,n SG)]
+γnSG[pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− pSG(nSS,n SG)]
+β [pSS (nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− pSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 ) ]
We now calculate the terms in square brackets.




α + β (c + δ)+
γβ











(2β+γ)(2β+γ−γn) (nSG +1 )δ




α + β (c − ε)+
γβ





α + β (c − ε)+
γβ




(2β+γ)(2β+γ−γn) (nSG +1 )δ




α + βc +
γβ


















(2β+γ)(2β+γ−γn) (n − 2)δ




α + β (c + δ)+
γβ





α + βc +
γβ







Using these expressions, we calculate the variation in output as






(γnSS − γ − β)
γβ
(2β+γ) (−nSG − 1)δ
+γnIS
γβ













Simplifying this expression, taking into account the fact that nSG =1 , leads to






(2β+γ) (n − 2)(γ + β)+β (β − γ)
i
δ





























We thus proved that
qSG(nSS − 1,n SG +1 )− qSS(nSS,n SG) > 0.
This completes the proof.
10 Appendix B : Proof of lemma 6
We proceed as for proposition 1, so that proving proposition 2 is just the same as proving
that (
mIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− mIG(nIG,n IS) > 0
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− qIG(nIG,n IS) > 0
Case 1 : nIG 6=1 ;nSG 6=1
mIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− mIG(nIG,n IS)




α − (β + γ − γn)(c − ε)+
γβ












(β + γ − γn)ε +
γβ





β + γ − γn +
γβ
2β+γ (n − 1)
´
ε > 0
qIG(nIG,n IS)=α +( γnIG − γ − β)pIG(nIG,n IS)
+γnISpIS(nIG,n IS)+γnSGpSG(nIG,n IS)
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )=α +( γnIS − β)pIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
+(γnIG − γ)pIG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )+γnSGpSG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− qIG(nIG,n IS)
26= γnSG
"





pIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
−pIS(nIG,n IS)
#
+(γnIG − γ − β)[pIG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− pIG(nIG,n IS)]
+β [pIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− pIG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 ) ]
Replacing the terms in square brackets with their expression, we show that :











qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )− qIG(nIG,n IS)=
β(β+γ−γn)(β+γ)+β3
(2β+γ−γn)(2β+γ) ε > 0
This completes the proof.
11 Appendix C : Proof of lemma 8




α − (β + γ − γn)(c − ε)+
γβ





α − (β + γ − γn)(c − ε)+
γβ





∂nISmIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )< 0
qIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )=α +( γnIS − β)pIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
+(γnIG − γ)pIG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )+γnSGpSG(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )
= α +( γnIS − β)pIS (nIG − 1,n IS +1 )














2β+γ (nIS +1 )ε
= α + 1
2β+γ−γn
£






2β+γ [(γnIS − β) − γ (nIS +1 ) ]( n − nIS − 1)ε
= α + 1
2β+γ−γn
£






2β+γ (β + γ)(n − nIS − 1)ε
= α + 1
2β+γ−γn
h
(γn − β − γ)(α + βc)+β
2ε −
γβ







2β+γ (β + γ)
i
nISε
27= α + 1
2β+γ−γn
(
(γn − β − γ)(α + βc)
+
β






∂nISqIS(nIG − 1,n IS +1 )< 0
This completes the proof.
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